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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Ethypharm S.A. France (“Ethypharm”) appeals the 
judgment of the United States District Court for the District 
of Delaware granting Abbott Laboratories (“Abbott”) 
summary judgment on Ethypharm‟s antitrust and state law 
claims.  Although the District Court ruled in Abbott‟s favor, it 
had earlier denied Abbott‟s motion to dismiss, a motion 
premised on the assertion that Ethypharm lacked standing to 
bring antitrust claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  Abbott has pressed its standing argument on 
appeal, and we conclude that the District Court erred in 
holding there is antitrust standing in this case.  Because 
Ethypharm‟s state law claims have not been argued on 
appeal, the District Court‟s judgment on those claims will 
remain undisturbed, but we will vacate the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment as to the federal claims and will 
remand with directions that they be dismissed for 
Ethypharm‟s lack of standing. 
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I. Background 
 
 A. Facts
1
 
 
Ethypharm is a privately held French corporation that 
develops and manufactures pharmaceutical drug products.  
The drug at issue in this case is a fenofibrate
2
 developed and 
manufactured by Ethypharm and carrying the brand name 
Antara®.  Because, as Ethypharm observes, entry into the 
United States pharmaceutical market requires “substantial 
time and resources,” it does not sell Antara directly in the 
United States.  (J.A. at 122.)  Instead, its business model was 
to “enter into a license and distribution agreement with a 
company in the United States.”  (J.A. at 122.)  Thus, in 2001, 
                                              
1
 Because we are primarily reviewing the District 
Court‟s denial of Abbott‟s motion to dismiss for lack of 
antitrust standing, we take as true all the factual allegations in 
the complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from those facts.  Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 
239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010); see also In re Warfarin Sodium 
Antitrust Litig., 214 F.3d 395, 398-99 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(applying Rule 12(b)(6) on motion to dismiss for lack of 
antitrust standing).  To the extent we recount facts outside of 
the complaint, we do so for informational purposes only and 
do not rest our decision on those facts. 
 
2
 “Fenofibric acid, the active metabolite of fenofibrate, 
produces reductions in total cholesterol, LDL cholesterol, 
apolipoprotein B, total triglycerides and triglyceride rich 
lipoprotein (VLDL) in treated patients.”  Physicians’ Desk 
Reference 565 (66th ed. 2012).   
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it entered into a Development, License, and Supply 
Agreement (“DLS”) with Reliant Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
(“Reliant”), an American company, pursuant to which Reliant 
would sell Antara in this country.  The DLS stated that 
Ethypharm would provide Reliant with the finished 
pharmaceutical product, or, at Reliant‟s option, the drug in 
bulk, which could then be encapsulated. 
 
Reliant “was responsible for obtaining regulatory 
approval for the drug, preparing appropriate packaging 
material, and then marketing the drug through the efforts of a 
large, motivated, and experienced sales force.”  (J.A. at 122.)  
To that end, the DLS granted exclusive rights to Reliant in the 
United States and allowed it to seek approval with the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) to market and sell 
Antara.
3
  Ethypharm explains in its Complaint
4
 that Reliant‟s 
role in exclusively marketing, selling, and obtaining FDA 
approval for Antara was critical because, without the 
“mechanism of the license and distribution agreement, 
Ethypharm would be foreclosed from the United States 
market.”  (J.A. at 122.)  Thus, without Reliant‟s, or some 
similar distributor‟s, willingness to take on the risk and 
expense of gaining FDA approval and marketing Antara, the 
drug could never have reached the United States market. 
                                              
3
 The DLS also gave Ethypharm a right of first refusal 
should Reliant seek to divest its rights in Antara.   
4
 Ethypharm filed its initial complaint on March 3, 
2008.  After Abbott filed a motion to dismiss that complaint, 
Ethypharm filed its Amended Complaint, the operative 
pleading, on July 2, 2008.  For simplicity, we refer to the 
Amended Complaint as the Complaint. 
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Consistent with the DLS, Reliant sought FDA 
approval of Antara pursuant to § 505(b)(2) of the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetics Act (“FDCA”).  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2).  
Reliant thus began the process of complying with the 
complex regulatory regime that governs how pharmaceuticals 
come to market in the United States.  Before a drug can be 
released, it must be approved by the FDA pursuant to the 
FDCA, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq.  The manufacturer of a new 
branded drug must submit detailed safety and efficacy data 
for the drug to the FDA in a New Drug Application (“NDA”).  
Id. § 355(a), (b)(1).  The NDA must also list “the patent 
number and the expiration date of any patent which claims 
the drug … or which claims a method of using such drug.”  
Id. § 355(b)(1).  After approval, information about the 
branded drug, including patent information, is published by 
the FDA in a publication entitled “Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” which is 
generally called the “Orange Book,” after the color of its 
cover.  See generally FDA Electronic Orange Book, 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm 
(last visited Dec. 3, 2012). 
 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984 (the “Hatch-Waxman Act”), codified 
at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355, 360cc and 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282, 
provides a framework for the introduction of generic versions 
of previously approved branded drugs.  Under that 
framework, a generic manufacturer may submit an 
Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) to the FDA.  
21 U.S.C. § 355(j).  The ANDA process allows the generic 
manufacturer to incorporate efficacy and safety data 
submitted to the FDA in the NDA for a branded drug, as long 
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as the generic drug is shown to be bioequivalent to that 
branded drug.  Id.  § 355(j)(2)(A). 
 
There is also a third kind of application that a drug 
manufacturer may use to obtain FDA approval, and that is the 
route Reliant chose for Antara.  Under § 505(b)(2) of the 
FDCA, a drug manufacturer may file an NDA for a drug that 
is not entirely new but is not simply a generic version of a 
branded drug.  For drugs that have changes from a branded 
drug, such that an ANDA application is unavailable, but 
whose changes are so slight that a manufacturer may rightly 
rely on the “full reports of investigations,” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(1), of the original drug to establish the new drug‟s 
safety and efficacy, an NDA may be filed pursuant to 
§ 505(b)(2), even though those investigations “were not 
conducted by or for the applicant and … the applicant has not 
obtained a right of reference or use from the person by or for 
whom the investigations were conducted,” id. § 355(b)(2).  
The § 505(b)(2) applicant must submit additional data to the 
FDA that demonstrates that any differences between the 
original drug and the § 505(b)(2) drug will not affect the 
§ 505(b)(2) drug‟s safety and efficacy.  See 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.54(a) (providing that § 505(b)(2) applications must 
provide data that supports any modification of the drug from 
the relied upon NDA).  But, having done that, a § 505(b)(2) 
applicant can avoid preclinical and certain human studies 
necessary in full NDA applications. 
 
Finally, much as when filing an ANDA application, a 
§ 505(b)(2) applicant must certify whether its drug will 
infringe any patents listed in the Orange Book.  21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(b)(2)(A).  Those certifications are as follows: “(i) that 
such patent information has not been filed (ii) that such patent 
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has expired, (iii) of the date on which such patent will expire, 
or (iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by 
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the 
application is submitted … .”  Id. § 355(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iv). 
 
Rather than conducting its own clinical studies, Reliant 
depended on the data of another, already approved, 
fenofibrate drug called TriCor®, which was developed by a 
French company named Laboratories Fournier (“Fournier”) 
and distributed by Abbott in the United States.
5
  Antara 
received FDA approval in November 2004, and Reliant began 
marketing the drug in February 2005.  Reliant chose not to 
make a certification under § 505(b)(2)(A)(iv) that Antara did 
not infringe any patents in the Orange Book or that those 
patents were invalid, but elected to market Antara 
immediately after gaining FDA approval.
6
  That marketing 
exposed Reliant to a possible infringement suit from Abbott, 
                                              
5
 Fournier granted Abbott an exclusive license to 
manufacture and sell TriCor in the United States.  Abbott 
listed the patents for TriCor in the Orange Book.   
6
 As explained above, a § 505(b)(2) applicant must 
make a certification pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A).  
Although Ethypharm admits in its Complaint that Reliant did 
not make a Paragraph IV certification, it also states in that 
Complaint that “Reliant provided notice of a regulatory filing 
and certification to Abbott in February 2004.”  (J.A. at 137.)  
The record is unclear what certification Reliant made, and it 
is also unclear what the consequences of not making a 
certification would have been for Reliant.  Neither party 
contends that such failure is relevant here.    
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making Reliant‟s launch of Antara “at risk.”7  In a 
prophylactic maneuver, Reliant filed a declaratory judgment 
action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware in June 2004, seeking a declaration of non-
infringement with respect to four of Abbott‟s fenofibrate 
patents, U.S. Patent Nos. 6,074,670 (the “‟670 patent”), 
6,277,405 (the “‟405 patent”), 6,589,552 (the “‟552 patent”), 
and 6,652,881 (the “‟881 patent”).  Reliant also argued that 
the patents were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.  
Abbott counterclaimed for infringement of two of the four 
patents.  Despite that lawsuit, Antara‟s net sales in 2005 were 
$23.5 million, and for the first half of 2006 they were $18.9 
million. 
 
In April 2006, Abbott and Reliant settled their patent 
dispute.  Fournier, TriCor‟s developer, was also a party to the 
settlement.  The three entered into a Settlement Term Sheet 
(“STS”) providing that Abbott and Fournier would grant a 
non-exclusive license to Reliant for the patents that were the 
subject of the lawsuit, along with U.S. Patent No. 4,895,726 
(the “‟726 patent”), another fenofibrate patent.  (See J.A. at 
247 (“Abbott and Fournier would grant Reliant a non-
exclusive license … under the [patents] to exploit [Antara8] in 
                                              
7
 In its Complaint, Ethypharm says that “Abbott 
responded in writing [to Reliant‟s regulatory filings] with a 
thinly-veiled threat to bring suit.”  (J.A. at 137.)      
 
8
 The STS also provided for a specific set of products 
that could be manufactured by Reliant: 
[T]he 43 mg, 87 mg and 130 mg fenofibrate 
capsule products that are the subject of 
Reliant‟s New Drug Application 21–695, as 
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the United States … .”).)  In exchange, “Reliant would make 
quarterly royalty payments to Abbott and Fournier in the total 
amount of 7% of Net Sales.”9  (J.A. at 248.)  If, however, 
Reliant was acquired or it sold off the Antara portion of its 
business,
10
 the new owner would not receive the benefit of a 7 
                                                                                                     
supplemented and/or amended from time to 
time.  Reliant Products do not include (i) any 
pharmaceutical products where fenofibrate is 
not the sole active ingredient, (ii) any 
combination therapy products or (iii) any 
products in a form other than a 43 mg, 87 mg or 
130 mg fenofibrate capsule. 
(J.A. at 246.)  Thus, the STS would not allow Reliant to 
create new doses or combination drugs that would be covered 
by the non-exclusive license. 
 
9
 The STS defines Net Sales as “the gross invoiced 
sales of the Reliant Products in the Territory under the 
License Agreement … .”  (J.A. at 244.)  The STS defines the 
Reliant Products to be “the 43 mg, 87 mg and 130 mg 
fenofibrate capsule products that are the subject of Reliant‟s 
New Drug Application 21-695 … .”  (J.A. at 246.) 
10
 The STS referred to this as a “Change of Control,” 
which was to include “the sale, lease, exchange, license or 
other disposition of all or substantially all of such Reliant[‟s] 
assets related to … [Antara] and … Reliant[‟s] other assets … 
.”; “a merger, consolidation, share exchange or similar 
corporate transaction as a result of which the holders of” 
Reliant‟s stock no longer owned the company; or “the 
acquisition” of Reliant by any person or company.  (J.A. at 
249.)  
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percent royalty; instead, “the License Fee … would increase 
to 10% of Net Sales.”  (Id.)  Relevant here, § 8 of the STS 
(the “Restricted Entity provision”) provided that: 
 
The license would contain additional customary 
terms and conditions including, without 
limitation, the following: …  (ii) no assignment, 
sublicense or other transfer of any rights 
relating to the Reliant Products (including the 
right to market and promote the Reliant 
Products) except: … (e) to acquirers … of any 
portion of Reliant [or its business] relating to 
the Reliant Products other than pursuant to a 
Change of Control, provided that any 
assignment, sublicense or other transfer of 
rights granted pursuant to Section 8(ii)(e), (A) 
to a Restricted Entity or Affiliate thereof, shall 
require the prior written consent of Abbott and 
(B) to any entity other than a Restricted Entity 
or Affiliate thereof shall be limited to [the ‟726, 
‟670, ‟405, ‟552 and ‟881 patents] unless 
Abbott consents to the assignment, sublicense 
or other transfer (in which case, Reliant‟s rights 
to [the patents and their continuations] may be 
included). 
 
(J.A. at 255-56.)  That provision effectively foreclosed 
Reliant from assigning its rights in Antara to any “Restricted 
Entity” or partnering with such an entity to market Antara in 
the United States.  The term “Restricted Entity” was defined 
to include, as the District Court summarized it, “about 20 
large pharmaceutical companies, 10 generic companies[,] and 
a few specialty pharmaceutical companies.”  (J.A. at 10.) 
 12 
 
 
In April 2006, Abbott and Reliant entered a stipulation 
of dismissal of the patent litigation in accordance with the 
STS.  A few months later, in July 2006, Reliant sold to 
Oscient Pharmaceutical Company (“Oscient”) the exclusive 
rights to market and sell Antara in the United States.  Oscient, 
a business that did not appear on the Restricted Entity list, 
paid Reliant $78 million for the exclusive rights to Antara, 
plus the cost of Reliant‟s remaining Antara inventory.11  
Ethypharm had a right of first refusal under the DLS, 
pursuant to which it could “acquire all rights in relation with 
[Antara] and the relevant Intellectual Property and 
Confidential Information belonging to RELIANT … .”  (J.A. 
at 320.)  But it declined to exercise that right and instead 
approved the sale to Oscient.  Abbott, however, exercising its 
rights under the DLS, did not give its approval.  As a result, 
Reliant was only able to assign its license to the five Abbott 
patents contained in the STS and not any future continuation 
                                              
11
 Although called a “New Drug Application,” an 
approved NDA is no longer an “application” in the commonly 
understood sense of the word.  It is, rather, the approval to 
participate in the United States pharmaceutical market.  See 
21 C.F.R. § 314.105(a) (explaining that once notice of an 
approved application is received by letter, marketing of the 
drug may begin, unless the FDA or some other provision of 
law has delayed that effective date).  The rights to an NDA 
are readily transferrable between owners, so long as the new 
owners comply with certain regulatory requirements.  See id. 
§ 314.72(a) (“An applicant may transfer ownership of its 
application.”); id. § 314.72(b) (“The new owner shall advise 
FDA about any change in the conditions in the approved 
application under § 314.70 … .”).  
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or divisional applications.  (See J.A. at 255 (noting that an 
assignment of Reliant‟s license from Abbott “to any entity 
other than a Restricted Entity or Affiliate thereof shall be 
limited to [the ‟726, ‟670, ‟405, ‟552 and ‟881 patents] unless 
Abbott consents to the assignment, sublicense or other 
transfer (in which case, Reliant‟s rights to [the patents and 
their continuations] may be included).”).) 
 
Oscient had some initial success with Antara.  Sales in 
2007 and 2008 were approximately $53.6 million and $73.8 
million respectively, up from $42.5 million in 2006.  But 
sales stagnated in 2009, with Oscient losing market share to 
generic fenofibrate manufacturers.  By the summer of 2009, 
Oscient had discontinued its promotion of Antara and filed 
for bankruptcy.  Lupin, a manufacturer of generic 
pharmaceuticals, purchased the rights to Antara for $38 
million from Oscient‟s bankruptcy estate, and, although 
Lupin is currently attempting to grow the market for the drug, 
its CEO testified that it is a difficult task because Abbott had 
solidified its place in the market while Oscient was 
floundering.  To that end, as of 2010, Antara‟s market share 
was only 2 to 4 percent, a far cry from the 25 to 33 percent 
Reliant initially hoped to capture when it launched Antara, 
but in line with the 2.2 and 3.4 percent market share Reliant 
had actually captured in 2005 and 2006, respectively. 
 
 B. Procedural History 
 
 Believing that the failure of Antara to compete with 
TriCor was a direct result of Abbott‟s patent suit against 
Reliant and of the resulting STS, particularly the Restricted 
Entity provision, Ethypharm filed this action against Abbott.  
The Complaint features antitrust and sham litigation claims 
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under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared 
to be illegal.”); id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, 
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any 
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade 
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign 
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony … .”), as well as a 
number of state law claims, including unfair competition, 
tortious interference with contract, tortious interference with 
prospective economic advantage, and common law restraint 
of trade.  According to Ethypharm, the STS was designed to 
make sure that Antara would be put in the hands of a 
company with “limited resources and a relatively small sales 
force,” so that it could not effectively compete with TriCor.  
(J.A. at 11.) 
 
In addition to citing the allegedly anticompetitive 
nature of the Restricted Entity provision, Ethypharm averred 
that the 7 percent royalty payment Reliant owed to Abbott 
restrained Ethypharm‟s ability to compete because, by 
collecting a royalty from Ethypharm‟s exclusive distributor, 
Abbott weakened Antara‟s profitability.  Ethypharm also 
claimed that the provisions of the STS preventing Oscient 
from developing new combination drugs or different doses of 
Antara further restricted the ability of Antara to compete 
against TriCor. 
 
Abbott initially moved to dismiss the Complaint for 
lack of antitrust standing, but the District Court denied that 
motion, holding that Ethypharm had the necessary standing to 
sue.  The Court determined that “a foreign name-brand 
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manufacturer, which does not itself market and distribute its 
product in the United States but does so through an exclusive 
United States distributor, is entitled to avail itself of the 
protection of the antitrust laws for the purpose of challenging 
the conduct of a manufacturer of a competing brand name 
drug.”  (J.A. at 11, 35.)12 
 
Following discovery, Abbott moved for summary 
judgment.  The District Court granted that motion, 
determining that Ethypharm had not presented enough 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a causal 
connection between the alleged antitrust injury and the 
damage it suffered.  Specifically, the Court concluded there 
was insufficient evidence that Abbott‟s allegedly 
anticompetitive conduct caused Antara‟s failure in the market 
and, therefore, Ethypharm‟s antitrust claim was untenable.  
(See J.A. at 20 (“Put simply, there are many market 
influences that may have contributed to Oscient‟s failure with 
Antara.”).)13 
                                              
12
 The District Court did grant Abbott‟s motion to 
dismiss Ethypharm‟s “unlawful restraint of trade” claim.  
Specifically, Abbott contended that Delaware‟s Antitrust Act, 
which codified a restraint of trade claim, see Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 6, § 2103, preempted a common law restraint of trade 
claim.  Ethypharm failed to respond to that argument, and the 
Court concluded that that failure doomed the claim.  (See J.A. 
at 43 (dismissing Ethypharm‟s restraint of trade claim 
because it failed to “articulate in some manner how its 
pleading meets the legal requirements of its claims”). 
13
 The District Court also granted summary judgment 
in favor of Abbott on Ethypharm‟s sham litigation claims.  
Ethypharm does not dispute that determination on appeal.   
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Ethypharm timely appealed. 
 
                                                                                                     
In addition, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Abbott on Ethypharm‟s state law claims.  
With respect to those claims, Ethypharm says, in a footnote at 
the close of its Opening Brief before us, that the District 
Court dismissed its state law claims without articulating a 
basis for that ruling.  (See Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 61 n.27 
(“The district court‟s decision did not separately address 
Ethypharm‟s three remaining state common law claims for 
unfair competition.”).)  In response, Abbott states it “is clear 
[as to why] the district court decided to dismiss the state law 
claims: Ethypharm cannot prove injury in fact.”  (Appellee‟s 
Br. at 58-59; J.A. at 20.)  We have consistently held that “[a]n 
issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and 
for those purposes a passing reference to an issue ... will not 
suffice to bring that issue before this court.”  Laborers’ Int’l 
Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 
26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see John Wyeth & Bro. Ltd. v. CIGNA Int’l Corp., 
119 F.3d 1070, 1076 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[A]rguments raised in 
passing (such as, in a footnote), but not squarely argued, are 
considered waived.”); see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. 
Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1320 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(“[A]rguments raised in footnotes are not preserved.”).  Thus, 
Ethypharm waived its appeal of its state law claims.  And 
because of Ethypharm‟s waiver, and because the District 
Court had diversity jurisdiction over those state law claims, 
see infra note 14, we will not disturb the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment for Abbott with respect to 
Ethypharm‟s state law claims.  
 17 
 
II. Discussion
14
 
 
Abbott argues that the District Court erred in 
concluding that Ethypharm had standing to bring its antitrust 
claims.  Specifically, Abbott says that Ethypharm does not 
compete with it because Ethypharm is not a supplier of 
Antara in the United States and, therefore, it cannot claim to 
                                              
14
 The District Court had jurisdiction over the federal 
antitrust claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and over the 
state law claims both as pendent claims pursuant to § 1367, 
and under diversity jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332 because 
Ethypharm is a French company, Abbott is an Illinois 
corporation, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
Our review of the District Court‟s denial of Abbott‟s 
motion to dismiss for lack of standing is plenary.  Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  We 
take as true all the factual allegations in the Complaint and 
the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those facts, 
Sheridan v. NGK Metals Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d 
Cir. 2010), but we disregard legal conclusions and 
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 262 n.27 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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have been harmed by any anticompetitive conduct here.  In 
short, it lacks antitrust standing.
15
 
  
 Standing is a threshold requirement in all actions in 
federal court.  It is moored in the constitutional principle that 
the judiciary‟s power only extends to cases or controversies.  
See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  Constitutional standing is 
“augmented by consideration of prudential limitations.”  City 
of Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 264 (3d 
Cir. 1998).  For plaintiffs suing under federal antitrust laws,
16
 
one of the prudential limitations is the requirement of 
                                              
15
Although Abbott did not file a cross-appeal, its 
standing argument is properly before us because it is “well 
established that an appellee may, without taking a cross-
appeal, support the judgment as entered through any matter 
appearing in the record, though his argument may attack the 
lower court‟s reasoning or bring forth a matter overlooked or 
ignored by the court.”  EF Operating Corp. v. Am. Bldgs., 
993 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1993).  We have held that 
antitrust standing “is simply another element of proof for an 
antitrust claim, rather than a predicate for asserting a claim in 
the first place.”  Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 307 
(3d Cir. 2011) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1876 (2012).  
Thus, by that reasoning, failure to establish antitrust standing 
is a merits issue properly before us.   
16
 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides the statutory 
authorization for a private antitrust suit: “[A]ny person who 
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws” may maintain a 
private action for treble damages.”  15 U.S.C. § 15. 
 19 
 
“antitrust standing.”  W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d at 264.17  
It does not affect the subject matter jurisdiction of the court, 
as Article III standing does, but prevents a plaintiff from 
recovering under the antitrust laws.  Gerlinger v. Amazon.com 
Inc., 526 F.3d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 2008). 
                                              
17
 Although not free from debate, we have explained 
that antitrust standing is based on prudential principles.  See 
W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d at 264 (“Thus, the crux of the 
issue in this case is whether the City satisfies the „prudential‟ 
requirements of standing; that is, does the City have „antitrust 
standing,‟ and is the plaintiff a proper party to bring a private 
antitrust action?”); see also Palmyra Park Hosp. Inc. v. 
Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 
2010) (“To have antitrust standing, a party must do more than 
meet the basic „case or controversy‟ requirement that would 
satisfy constitutional standing; instead, the party must show 
that it satisfies a number of prudential considerations aimed at 
preserving the effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Erwin Chemerinski, 
Federal Jurisdiction § 2.3.6 (5th ed. 2007) (explaining 
prudential standing requirement that a plaintiff be within the 
zone of interest protected by a statute).  We have also 
indicated, however, that, at least in a state law context, 
antitrust standing is a kind of “statutory standing.”  Sullivan, 
667 F.3d at 307 (characterizing state law antitrust claims as 
involving “statutory standing”).  In this case, whether the 
standing inquiry is characterized as “prudential” or 
“statutory” makes no difference because neither deprives us 
of Article III jurisdiction and both bar a plaintiff‟s ability to 
recover. 
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The Supreme Court, in Associated General 
Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983), articulated several factors 
to be considered when deciding whether a complainant has 
antitrust standing.  We have organized those factors (the 
“AGC factors”) into the following multifactor test: 
 
(1) the causal connection between the antitrust 
violation and the harm to the plaintiff and the 
intent by the defendant to cause that harm, with 
neither factor alone conferring standing; (2) 
whether the plaintiff‟s alleged injury is of the 
type for which the antitrust laws were intended 
to provide redress; (3) the directness of the 
injury, which addresses the concerns that liberal 
application of standing principles might 
produce speculative claims; (4) the existence of 
more direct victims of the alleged antitrust 
violations; and (5) the potential for duplicative 
recovery or complex apportionment of 
damages. 
 
In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 
1144, 1165-66 (3d Cir. 1993).  The second factor, antitrust 
injury, “is a necessary but insufficient condition of antitrust 
standing.”  Barton & Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 118 F.3d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1997).  If it is lacking, we 
need not address the remaining AGC factors. 
 
Generally, antitrust injury – that is, “injury of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows 
from that which makes [the] defendants‟ acts unlawful,” 
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Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 
489 (1977) – “is limited to consumers and competitors in the 
restrained market and to those whose injuries are the means 
by which the defendants seek to achieve their anticompetitive 
ends,” W. Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 
F.3d 85, 102 (3d Cir. 2010).  Ethypharm, of course, does not 
claim to be a consumer.  Therefore, for Ethypharm to have 
standing it must be either a competitor in the defined relevant 
market or it must have suffered such injuries as “are the 
means by which the defendant[] seek[s] to achieve [its] 
anticompetitive ends.”  Id. 
 
Abbott contends that Ethypharm fits neither 
qualification.  First, Abbott argues that Ethypharm is not a 
supplier of Antara in the United States but only an offerer of 
intellectual property licenses and raw materials, which are not 
interchangeable with the drug that Abbott offers.  Second, 
Abbott contends that “Ethypharm‟s alleged injury is not the 
„means‟ by which Abbott” allegedly restrained competition.  
(Appellee‟s Br. at 43.)  Abbott reasons that it effectuated its 
allegedly illegal restraint of trade without any need to affect 
Ethypharm because Abbott needed only to place restrictions 
on Reliant, the sole United States distributor of Antara. 
 
Ethypharm counters that it produces not just raw 
materials but a finished drug that directly competes with 
Abbott‟s product.  According to Ethypharm, the fact that it 
markets and sells Antara through an exclusive distributor to 
bring that product to the United States is irrelevant.  Thus, 
Ethypharm argues, its “offering of the manufactured product 
is reasonably interchangeable with Abbott‟s offering of 
TriCor.”  (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 17 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).)  Ethypharm also contends that even if it did 
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not directly compete with Abbott, it has suffered antitrust 
injury because the harm caused by Abbott to Ethypharm is 
“inextricably intertwined with Abbott‟s alleged wrongdoing.”  
(Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).) 
 
In making their arguments about whether Ethypharm 
and Abbott are competitors in the relevant market, the parties 
focus on two of our precedents in particular, Barton & 
Pittinos, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 118 F.3d 178 (3d 
Cir. 1997), and Carpet Group International v. Oriental Rug 
Importers Association, Inc., 227 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2000), 
abrogated on other grounds by Animal Sci. Prods., Inc. v. 
China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462 (3d Cir. 2011).
18
  In 
Barton & Pittinos, we determined that a drug marketing 
company did not have antitrust standing to sue a drug 
manufacturer after the manufacturer chose to sever its 
relationship with the marketer.  Barton & Pittinos had entered 
into an agreement with SmithKline to market SmithKline‟s 
hepatitis-B vaccine to nursing homes.  Barton & Pittinos 
would solicit orders from nursing homes and pass those 
orders on to a third party, General Injectables and Vaccines, 
Inc. (“GIV”), “which would buy the vaccine from 
[SmithKline] and then resell it to the nursing homes.”  Barton 
& Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 179.  Previously, pharmacists had 
supplied nursing homes with SmithKline‟s vaccine, and those 
                                              
18Abbott‟s argument relies heavily on our non-
precedential opinion in SigmaPharm, Inc. v. Mutual Pharm. 
Co., 454 F. App‟x 64 (3d Cir. 2011).  We do not address that 
case, see 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7 (2010) (“The court by tradition 
does not cite to its not precedential opinions as authority.”), 
but instead look to the case upon which SigmaPharm rests its 
reasoning, our precedential opinion in Barton & Pittinos. 
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pharmacists complained to SmithKline about the arrangement 
with Barton & Pittinos.  In response to those complaints, 
SmithKline terminated its arrangement with Barton & 
Pittinos.  Barton & Pittinos then brought suit contending that 
SmithKline had conspired with the pharmacists to restrain 
competition in the distribution of the vaccine, in violation of 
§ 1 of the Sherman Act. 
 
We held that Barton & Pittinos had no standing to 
avail itself of the antitrust laws because it was not a 
competitor in the market and, accordingly, could not suffer 
antitrust injury.  Speaking for the court, then-Judge Alito 
reasoned that Barton & Pittinos was essentially an advertiser 
and not a competitor in the relevant drug market.  Id. at 182.  
We first defined the proper market, as Barton & Pittinos had, 
as “all hepatitis-B vaccine sold to nursing homes in the 
United States.”  Id. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Then, we considered whether Barton & Pittinos was a 
competitor by determining if there was cross-elasticity of 
demand between the pharmacists‟ offerings and Barton & 
Pittinos‟s offerings.  In analyzing that question, we focused 
not on the overall marketing program devised by SmithKline, 
but on what Barton & Pittinos itself offered.  That is, Barton 
& Pittinos offered marketing services but did not have direct 
access to the vaccine and could not supply the vaccine to 
nursing homes without GIV.  The pharmacists, in contrast, 
could supply nursing homes directly with the vaccine.  
Because nursing homes only had indirect access to the 
vaccine through Barton & Pittinos, “there was no cross-
elasticity of demand as between the pharmacists‟ offerings 
and [Barton & Pittinos‟s] offerings; no matter how much the 
pharmacists raised the price of the package of the goods and 
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services that they offered, the nursing homes could not have 
switched to [Barton & Pittinos].”  Id. at 183. 
 
We concluded that Barton & Pittinos‟s position as an 
advertiser made its injury different from the type of injury 
that the antitrust laws were designed to redress.  See id. at 184 
(“Because [Barton & Pittinos] was thus not a competitor or 
consumer in the market in which trade was allegedly 
restrained by the antitrust violations pled by [Barton & 
Pittinos], we hold that [its] alleged injury is not „antitrust 
injury,‟ meaning injury „of the type that the antitrust statute 
was intended to forestall.‟” (quoting Associated Gen. 
Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540)).  Barton & Pittinos thus lacked 
antitrust standing. 
 
 In contrast to Barton & Pittinos, we concluded in 
Carpet Group International that a plaintiff did have antitrust 
standing.  Carpet Grp. Int’l, 227 F.3d at 78.  In that case, 
Carpet Group International sought to provide a direct link 
between oriental rug manufacturers and domestic retailers, 
cutting out middlemen wholesalers, who were united by a 
trade group, the Oriental Rug Importers Association.  Carpet 
Group International bypassed the wholesalers by inviting 
manufacturers and retailers to trade shows where the retailers 
could buy directly from the manufacturers.  Carpet Group 
International also organized buying trips where the retailers 
could go abroad to see and directly purchase rugs.  Oriental 
Rug Importers responded by, among other tactics, threatening 
not to buy from any manufacturer who attended a trade show 
or sold directly to a retailer during a buying trip.  Those 
actions prompted Carpet Group International to bring an 
antitrust action. 
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Oriental Rug Importers relied on Barton & Pittinos to 
argue that Carpet Group International did not have antitrust 
standing.  We noted, however, that Carpet Group 
International‟s role in the oriental rug market was different 
from Barton & Pittinos‟s role in the relevant drug market.  
Barton & Pittinos, as an unlicensed entity, could not supply 
drugs to consumers, but, in contrast, Carpet Group 
International and Oriental Rug Importers could and did offer 
the exact same service to consumers – a way to procure rugs 
from manufacturers.  “In other words, there [was] a cross-
elasticity of demand between the plaintiffs‟ offering and the 
defendants‟ offering.”  Id. at 77; see id. (“If the 
wholesaler/importers raised the prices at which they sold 
oriental rugs to domestic retailers, those retailers could go to 
[Carpet Group International‟s] trade shows and purchase rugs 
there directly from manufacturers.”).  Thus, the injury that 
Carpet Group International claimed to have suffered was an 
antitrust injury. 
  
 As one might expect, Abbott contends that this case is 
controlled by Barton & Pittinos, and Ethypharm says it is not 
and that Carpet Group is the pertinent authority.  Although 
this is a closer case than Barton & Pittinos because 
Ethypharm does manufacture a product ultimately sold in the 
relevant market, we think Abbott has the better of the 
arguments.  Ethypharm is not a competitor because, in the 
highly regulated pharmaceutical market in this country, there 
is no cross-elasticity of demand between Ethypharm‟s 
offerings and Abbott‟s offerings.  In this case, as in Barton & 
Pittinos, customers in the United States cannot purchase the 
drug at issue from Ethypharm.  Ethypharm structured its 
business in a way that assured that only Reliant or someone to 
whom Reliant sold the rights to Antara could supply the drug.  
 26 
 
Ethypharm has chosen, for reasons sufficient to itself, not to 
seek the necessary approval to sell pharmaceuticals in the 
United States.
19
  It is thus forbidden to compete in the 
relevant market.  Because of its choice to leave to an 
exclusive licensee the responsibility of obtaining FDA 
approval for Antara and of selling and marketing that drug in 
the United States, there is no cross-elasticity of demand 
between what Ethypharm can lawfully offer, i.e., bulk drug 
sales from outside the United States to an FDA-approved 
entity, and what Abbott offers, a finished pharmaceutical 
product within the United States. 
 
Indeed, Ethypharm‟s own Complaint defines the 
relevant market in this case as the sale of fenofibrate products 
in the United States.  (J.A. at 143 (“For purposes of this 
Complaint, the relevant geographic market is the United 
States.  The relevant product market is products containing 
fenofibrate.”).)  When looking through that market lens, 
Ethypharm does not and cannot compete with Abbott.  
Similar to Barton & Pittinos, Ethypharm, on its own, cannot 
directly supply the United States market with the drug in 
question.  See Barton & Pittinos, 118 F.3d at 180 
(recognizing that Barton & Pittinos “lacked the required 
[regulatory] license to … sell the vaccine”).  It did not enter 
the United States market and receive the required FDA 
approval to market Antara; Reliant alone obtained that 
approval.  Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (requiring pharmaceutical 
                                              
19
 Not only did Ethypharm choose not to initially enter 
the United States market with Antara, it passed on a second 
opportunity to do so when it declined to exercise its right of 
first refusal at the time Reliant transferred its rights in Antara, 
complete with the approved NDA. 
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companies to obtain FDA approval before marketing 
prescription drugs).  In fact, as Ethypharm explained in its 
Complaint, that was its entire business plan: 
 
While Ethypharm develops, formulates, and 
manufactures its fenofibrate product for sale in 
the United States, it does not directly sell and 
distribute this product in this country.  Instead, 
Ethypharm sought a business partner who 
would enter into an agreement to: license 
Ethypharm‟s underlying patent and intellectual 
property rights; obtain U.S. regulatory approval 
for the product; and market the product in the 
U.S. 
 
(J.A. at 113.)  And without a license of its own, Ethypharm 
admits that it “would be foreclosed from the United States 
market.”  (J.A. at 122.)  Therefore, just like the pharmacists‟ 
ability to raise prices of the vaccine in Barton & Pittinos and 
the nursing homes‟ inability to procure that vaccine directly 
from Barton & Pittinos, Abbott could raise the price of TriCor 
and consumers could not turn to Ethypharm for Antara. 
 
Ethypharm argues, and the District Court appeared to 
agree, that “Reliant‟s role as the holder of the Antara NDA 
makes no difference” with respect to the antitrust injury 
inquiry.  (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 17.)  We disagree; 
Ethypharm‟s inability to participate in the United States 
fenofibrate market makes all the difference.  Contrary to 
Ethypharm‟s contention, Reliant was not a mere conduit in 
bringing Antara to market.  Reliant was the entity that took 
the risk and bore the expense of filing the NDA and gaining 
FDA approval.  The FDA carefully regulates the 
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pharmaceutical industry and imposes stringent requirements 
on entities seeking to sell drugs in the United States.  See 
generally 21 U.S.C. § 355 (describing requirements for NDA 
approvals); id. § 393 (establishing the FDA and providing its 
scope).  It is that high legal barrier to entry, specific to the 
United States pharmaceutical market, that differentiates this 
case from others in which a manufacturer has a legal right to 
sell a good in the United States but chooses to utilize an 
exclusive distributor. 
Ethypharm wants to have it both ways: it wants to pass 
on to a licensee the expense and risk of qualifying to compete 
in the United States pharmaceutical market, but, when that 
arrangement fails to achieve success, Ethypharm seeks to 
avail itself of the United States laws protecting fair 
competition.  The rules of antitrust standing do not permit that 
tactic.  We stress that it is not the general arrangement of 
manufacturer and distributor that is problematic; it is the fact 
that Ethypharm cannot sell Antara in the United States 
because of legal barriers particular to the pharmaceutical 
market, barriers that Ethypharm chose not to surmount.  
Ethypharm is literally not a lawful competitor in the United 
States fenofibrate market, and so it cannot be considered a 
competitor for purposes of antitrust injury.
20
 
                                              
20
 Ethypharm cites a district court case, Chemi SpA v. 
GlaxoSmithKline, 356 F. Supp. 2d 495 (E.D. Pa. 2005), in 
support of its position that it has antitrust standing.  That 
decision, however, fails to consider Barton & Pittinos under 
the antitrust injury prong of antitrust standing.  It also appears 
to rest its decision on the “inextricably intertwined” theory of 
antitrust injury, which we conclude is lacking in this case, see 
infra.  In addition, the plaintiff in that case, a foreign drug 
manufacturer, filed a Drug Master File with the FDA and “set 
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Ethypharm also argues that even if it is not a 
competitor in the United States fenofibrate market, it suffered 
antitrust injury because its injury is “inextricably intertwined” 
with Abbott‟s conduct such that Ethypharm‟s “injuries are the 
means by which the defendants seek to achieve their 
anticompetitive ends.”  W. Penn Allegheny Health, 627 F.3d 
at 102.  In Gulfstream III Associates, Inc. v. Gulfstream 
Aerospace Corp., we recognized the “inextricably 
intertwined” exception to the usual requirement that an 
antitrust plaintiff be either a competitor or consumer.  995 
F.2d 425, 429 (3d Cir. 1993).
21
  There, we stated that antitrust 
                                                                                                     
forth other required information for FDA approval” of its 
drug.  Id. at 497.  Therefore, the plaintiff‟s involvement in the 
FDA approval process distinguishes ChemiSpA from this 
case.   
 
21
 The “inextricably intertwined” antitrust injury 
originated in Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 
465 (1982).  There, the Court recognized that antitrust injury 
may be suffered by those other than competitors when the 
“injury alleged is so integral an aspect” of the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct that “the loss was precisely the type 
of loss that the claimed violations ... would be likely to 
cause.”  Id. at 479 (omission in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  It went on to conclude that that test had been 
met because “the injury [the plaintiff] suffered was 
inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators 
sought to inflict.”  Id. at 484.  Thus, an “inextricably 
intertwined” antitrust injury is limited to plaintiffs “whose 
injuries are the essential means by which defendants‟ illegal 
conduct brings about its ultimate injury to the marketplace.”  
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injury occurs if “there exists a „significant causal connection‟ 
such that the harm to the plaintiff can be said to be 
„inextricably intertwined‟ with the antitrust conspiracy.”  Id. 
at 429; see also Carpet Group, 227 F.3d at 77 (concluding 
there was antitrust injury because of inextricable 
intertwinement).  Since that time, however, we have not 
extended the “„inextricably intertwined‟ exception beyond 
cases in which both plaintiffs and defendants are in the 
business of selling goods or services in the same relevant 
market,” though they may not directly compete against each 
other.  Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 
320-21 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  Thus, Ethypharm‟s 
argument that its injuries are inextricably intertwined with 
Abbott‟s conduct – that is, the “injuries are the means by 
which [Abbott] seek[s] to achieve [its] anticompetitive ends,” 
W. Penn Allegheny Health, 627 F.3d at 102 – fails for the 
same reason its argument that it is a competitor fails: 
Ethypharm itself, by its own choice, is not in the United 
States fenofibrate market. 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that Ethypharm did not 
suffer antitrust injury because it does not and indeed cannot 
compete in the United States fenofibrate market, unless and 
until it acquires the required FDA approval to do so.  As a 
result, Ethypharm lacks antitrust standing to sue Abbott.
22
 
                                                                                                     
IIA Philip E. Areeda, et al., Antitrust Law: An Analysis of 
Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 339, at 123 (3d 
ed. 2007).   
22
 Because we conclude that Ethypharm did not suffer 
antitrust injury, we do not address any of the other AGC 
factors in the antitrust standing analysis.  Nor do we reach the 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the reasons above, we will vacate the grant of 
summary judgment as to Ethypharm‟s federal claims, leave 
undisturbed the grant of summary judgment as to 
Ethypharm‟s state law claims, and remand the case to the 
District Court to dismiss the federal claims for lack of 
standing. 
                                                                                                     
issue of whether the District Court erred in its analysis of the 
merit of Abbott‟s motion for summary judgment. 
